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There are drawings by Adolph Menzel (1815-1905) in
which the black lead of his carpenter’s pencil has been
pressed into the paper with tremendous force, far
exceeding the demands of the form or the requirements
of the shading in that precinct of the image. I said to
Kathrin:  What we see here is ×rst-hand evidence of
Menzel’s desire—his compulsion—to make the world
as real to him, and at the same time to make himself as
real to the world, as it was within his power to achieve.
At whatever cost to strict ×delity to appearances, which
was of urgent concern to him but only up to a point. As
Kafka notes in another connection, “That is the point
that must be reached.”
—Michael Fried, “In the Kupferstichkabinett” 1
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Formalism in the visual arts just won’t quite go away. Ever since the
full recognition in the early twentieth century that form could ground
a distinct theory of art, writers in search of a de×nition that would
differentiate it from their own views have embraced two premises:
the idea that adherents of the theory understand contemplation of
the form of an artwork to be both necessary and suf×cient for its
aesthetic evaluation; and the idea that this contemplation is a
univocal, pure, or essentially content-less one. On this basis it has
been attacked for over a hundred years as a solipsistic, ‘aestheticist,’
position—the embodiment of everything wrong with the legacy of
nineteenth-century “art for art’s sake” thinking. But while formalism
in this extreme sense may have existed as ‘the name of a generative
ideal’ for artists and ‘the name of a research program’ for critics, as a
description of an actual way in which anyone in the past looked at
things it is dif×cult to take seriously.
Here I want to pursue a different line. This essay is one of a set
analysing the preference for the analogical and allegorical in present
day writing on the visual, in particular as manifested in  Anglo-
American art history.  Unlike the others, in what follows I turn to a
more historical dimension of this tendency, linking it with an earlier
vein of art writing—”formalism”—with which continuity has not
always been countenanced. The ×rst aim is historiographic, in a
pointed sense. Despite important corrective writing on formalism, the
nuanced version has largely failed to ×lter into discussion of the
modernist art and literature with which formalism is so often linked,
and where as a result the problematically narrow version raised
above is still widely taken as a starting point. The other aim is more
contemporary. The broad version is often upheld with or without
acknowledgement of its place in a longer tradition of art writing.
Placing it within this tradition is not to criticise it, exactly, but it is to
shed a particular light on some of its premises and assumptions, as
well as to stress its difference from a range of other options in critical
and historical work today. It’s also to try to model a practical account
overarching enough to come to terms with the fact that so many
with widely varying justi×cations of their views have been able to call
themselves formalists, or conversely to work in importantly similar
ways even if rejecting the formalist label.
All of this means analyzing formalism sympathetically, though
somewhat at a distance, with an eye to the continued allure of form
in speaking to notions of style, signi×cation, affect, materiality,
expression, and so forth. In doing so here I bring to light a unifying
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aspect to formalisms past and present, something that may be so
obvious and pervasive that it is almost universally taken for granted.
This is the role form plays  via style, as the element in between
producing artist and consuming viewer, in a very limited sense of
communication, of “making contact.”  Broadly, form is taken to be
the basis of the ability to recreate or recuperate the original
functioning of the work: securing correspondence of experience
between makers and viewers of artworks; conveying expressed
thought and feeling; grounding historical re-enactment; or simply
guaranteeing that one can properly assess its historical operation. For
this reason, form becomes a privileged tool for historical analysis of
the visual: the element through which one can move from personal
experience of the work (its effects) to historical assumptions about
the nature of that work (its structure), to its production, and its
context, and back. Form itself may be a structural feature analyzable
apart from historical and psychological speculation, as in Viktor
Shklovsky’s description of form as “the principle underlying the
construction of the object.”  But it is the resulting ability to securely
identify the proper functioning of the work that allows, in turn, for
the most ambitious of narrativized interpretations to make the
characteristic double claim—to operate primarily through ×rst-hand
experience, and to be truly “historical” nonetheless.
Style and Communication
Aiming to support the use of form in Marxist criticism in a way that
might shed the tainted “Bloomsbury” legacy, many years ago
Raymond Williams attempted to clear up confusion over the multiple
legacies of formalism with a distinction between “form,” used on the
one hand to mean “outward show” or “super×cial appearance,” and
on the other to mean “shaping principle.”  The ×rst explains the
narrow, morphological or “manifest,” view—form as a discernible
property of artworks that is something like their external shape or
composition. The latter meaning is closer to “forming”—form as the
“how” of the work that implies process, structuring, creation, and
individual “style.” As a very basic distinction, this usefully points
towards a binary that has come to underpin the categorization of
formalisms. On the one hand are the most commonly attacked kinds,
focused on external shape to the exclusion of both process and
representation, and linked by Williams, amongst others, to “art for
art’s sake” views, concerned with “purely” aesthetic interests.  This is
the understanding evocatively presented in T.J. Clark’s description of
his quarrel with “formalism” as with an “old picture of visual
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imaging as pursued in a trance-like removal from human
concerns”—a view that harks back to the same Bloomsbury tradition
that Williams was writing against.  On the other hand are what
critics of these narrow kinds have seen as the “good” alternatives—
formalisms that incorporate elements of Russian formalism, critical
theory, semiotics, and phenomenology, and as such are widely
appealed to in the present day.  Clark again: “It is the form of our
statements, and the structure of our visualizations, that truly are our
ways of world-making—at any rate the ways that hold us deepest in
thrall.”  It is this latter kind that Richard Neer has defended as “a
worldly—that is, political—formalism: one that is prepared to draw
far-reaching conclusions on matters of historical fact from the
smudges on a painted thigh, say that of Manet’s  Olympia  (T.J.
Clark), or the perspectival construction of a painted dining room, say
that of Leonardo’s Last Supper (Leo Steinberg).”
The broad distinction also holds good for the accounts found in
analytic philosophy of art, where the writers often taken to have
revived and in part set the discipline on its contemporary course—
Arthur Danto, Richard Wollheim, and Nelson Goodman—all dealt at
points with the questions of style and expression, but with no
indication that this might bear a close relation to what the early
twentieth-century “formalist” art critics and theorists had always
been getting at.  This explains why the same analytic philosopher
can speak negatively of Roger Fry- and Clive Bell-type formalism as a
theory which concentrates solely on pure contemplation of the
con×gured properties of artworks,  while in another context talking
positively of “style or form” or “stylistic or formal research” as if
these were direct synonyms.  In the latter case this philosopher,
Noël Carroll, can  advocate  attention to “form,” this time used to
mean the work’s “style,” or the general way in which the maker has
created its signi×cant features.  It was on this basis that Arthur
Danto could joke that Fry and Bell had never actually said what was
“signi×cant” about “signi×cant form,” and make no reference to any
similarity with his own view of individual artistic “style” as grounded
in the expressive effects of the artist’s distortions of the natural world
—the difference in artistic representation from a fully naturalistic,
“transparent,” rendering of the scene.  All the same, compare Danto
in 1981, “…one must decide which distortions are due to
representational ineptitude and which to expressive force…but it is
possible to suppose that the place in which the concepts we are after,
of style and expression and even metaphor, are to be found in those
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discrepancies between image and motif which the transparency
theorists can only give a negative value to, and attribute to a failure
of mimesis,” with Fry in 1911, “I am going to assume that you will all
agree with me in saying that the artist’s business is not merely the
reproduction and literal copying of things seen:—that he is expected
in some way or other to misrepresent and distort the visual world.”
There are, clearly, some deep parallels between card-carrying
formalists and many of those who have consciously tried to “move
on” from form.
The rigid distinctions between “two” formalisms depend on a neat
cleaving of “form” from “style,” as if there were no bleeding of the
creative process into the ×nished product. But while this separation is
possible in theory, it is crucial to understand that formalist
critical practice relies on collapsing the two. The object’s role as link
between artist and viewer is a key point over which the binaries
begin to fall apart, as it highlights that even when critics take form as
a static end point, this is only one moment in a mode of analysis that
ultimately uses it as a tool of enquiry into originating conditions.
One of the most straightforward starting points here is Paul de Man’s
comment on the critical methodology that he took to be exemplary
of formalism:
For [I.A.] Richards, the task of criticism consists in
correctly apprehending the signifying value, or meaning,
of the work; an exact correspondence between the
author’s originary experience and its communicated
expression. For the author, the labor of formal
elaboration consists in constructing a linguistic structure
that will correspond as closely as possible to the initial
experience. Once it is granted that such a
correspondence is established by the author, it will exist
for the reader as well, and what is called communication
can then occur.
The initial experience may be anything at all and need
not have anything speci×cally “aesthetic” about it. Art is
justi×ed as the preservation of moments in “the lives of
exceptional people, when their control and command of
experience is at its highest degree . . .” The critic’s task
consists in retracing the author’s journey backward: It
will proceed from a careful and precise study of the
signifying form toward the experience that produced
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this form. Correct critical understanding is achieved
when it reaches the cluster of experience, elicited
through reading, insofar as they remain suf×ciently close
to the experience or experiences the author started out
with.
This passage might be taken as a good demonstration of why
formalist critics have occasionally placed so much stress on
“content.”  Form is here an intentional “structure” of the work that
corresponds to artistic “experience,” and allows for “what is called
communication.” This makes form the vehicle for content rather
than something set against it; the aspect that allows for the sort of
tracking through the artwork to the activity of the artist that is just as
often described as a function of “style.” Writing in the 1950s as part
of his critique of New Criticism, de Man was arguing for the
inevitable failure of Richards’ project and those that followed; of the
constitutive rather than merely imitative relation between language
and experience, and the resulting impossibility of perfect continuity
between writing (or “form”) and the writer’s (and thus reader’s)
experience. There were nonetheless then and since principled
counters to de Man’s critique, as well as a range of practices that
simply bypassed it without too much concern (both points I’ll get to
below).  It’s also worth stressing that de Man was talking of
linguistic communication, but while I.A. Richards is rarely linked with
contemporary formalist art theory and criticism, the same ideas can
be found in discussions of visual art in the writings of those
associated with “good” and narrow formalisms alike. This occurs, in
other words, in contexts ranging from the earlier avant-garde, such
as Wassily Kandinsky in 1910:
The work of art comprises two elements: the inner and
the outer. The inner element, taken in isolation, is the
emotion in the soul of the artist that causes a
corresponding vibration (in material terms, like the note
of one musical instrument that causes the corresponding
note on another instrument to vibrate in sympathy) in
the soul of another person, the receiver. As long as the
soul remains joined to the body, it can as a rule only
receive vibrations via the medium of the senses, which
form a bridge from the immaterial to the material (in
the case of the artist) and from the material to the
immaterial (in the case of the spectator). Emotion—
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sensation—the work of art—sensation—emotion. The
vibration in the soul of the artist must therefore ×nd a
material form, a means of expression, which is capable
of being picked up by the receiver. This material form is
thus the second, i.e., external, element of the work of
art…In art, form is invariably determined by content.
Through to mainstream discussions, such as Roger Fry’s reply to an
article by the popular critic J.E. Barton, published in the BBC’s The
Listener magazine in 1932:
The work of art is really a transaction between the artist
and the spectator; it is a direct link, for those who can
see it properly, with the profoundest parts of the artist’s
nature. It is, as Mr. Barton says, a purely human value
and has to do with essentially human values…What
happens to us when we are thrilled by the beauty of
Rembrandt’s drawing is that the particular rhythms of
his lines transmit to us, not only the likeness of the sow,
but also Rembrandt’s imaginative excitement as he
apprehended certain relations of form in what he
contemplated, and that excitement and exultation
depended upon his peculiarly intense emotional reaction
to life, an emotion expressed in his case through his
speci×c sense of visible form. So whatever he drew he
was almost always able to make us share in that
emotional experience and to feel ourselves incredibly
richer and, as Mr. Barton so well puts it, more civilised
by that. Except so far as the sow stimulated in
Rembrandt this emotional exultation she is really not in
the picture at all.
A “bridge,” a “transaction,” a “link”; with “soul,” “imaginative
excitement,” “emotion,” not only expressed but received and
understood. Back in 1989 David Summers wrote that this tradition
had lived on in art history, where one was expected to move in a
neat chain of expressed essences from form to history: the
“elongated linear forms and nondescriptive colors of mannerist
painting,” to the “psychological extremities” of Pontormo and Rosso
Fiorentino, and in turn to the “anguish and spiritual crisis” brought
on by the “Sack of Rome, the Siege of Florence, and the
Reformation.”  In late modernist art history of the time semiotics
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had offered a glimpse of an alternative method that would reject
“form” for “historical reconstruction of the likely meaning of any
instance of the many codes discernible in a work of art” (and in
which this latter reconstruction would replace form as the basis for
“higher interpretation”). Even there, however, the still-overwhelming
desire to use extremely close attention to the visual to make “intuitive
inferences” to the historical meant that visual analogy and
allegorically structured interpretation regularly Øoated free from strict
semiotic determination—the distinction between “expressive form”
and “sign” was freely collapsed.  All of this brings together early
and later formalisms, and suggests that the implied connection of
producer and consumer, rather than say “disinterested”
contemplation of the art object, is a worthy candidate for a unifying
account of formalism.
Explaining the general neglect of this artist-viewer connection is
simple enough, given the tendency of commentators since to
privilege isolated theoretical statements over actual critical practice.
Although the broadened view of formalism should be logically
independent of claims made about what form  does, single claims
about the effects of form (such as the generation of “aesthetic
experience”) have regularly been taken as suf×cient accounts of the
theory as a whole. Over the course of the twentieth century form’s
signi×cance was associated with a host of ideas: the production of
particular feelings and emotions in the viewer; connection to the
temperament, sensibility, “vision,” or imagination of the maker;
contact with “reality,” or universal rhythms or structures; and the
revelation of new, truer or just less everyday, ways of seeing the
world. (Even Clive Bell’s Art within the space of a few pages moves
between appeals to communication of expressed emotion,
experiences of pure and disinterested “aesthetic emotion,” and the
uncovering of deeper reality.) Far from mutually exclusive and
competing, these multiple views were and are regularly alternated
between or combined, even at moments feeding off of and relying on
each other.  But while the communicative idea was clearly and
regularly articulated, the fact that the same writers would in their
texts cycle through a number of explanations of art’s importance has
allowed commentators then and since to ×xate on the one idea they
have expected to ×nd as if it provides the key to a de×nition of
formalism—to draw out the narrow view of the theory through
selective quotation, leaving behind more complex theoretical
articulations and practical applications, and in doing so missing out
on its general nature.
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Historical explanation of the unifying account—or simply the
communicative idea at its heart—is a more complex issue, and a
wide range of interpretations are now available. Looking solely at
turn-of-the-twentieth-century writers whose work was associated
with “form,” an enormous range of reasons have been put forward,
from the French symbolist claim to formal equivalents for emotional
experiences, to the empathy-theory-based claim for identi×cation
with the psychomotor processes of the artist as objecti×ed in the
forms of their work, to the claim associated with WölfØin’s art
history for recovery through comparative analysis (and a good
measure of intuition) of the “form of representation” or mode of
vision of the work.  Just like with non-communicative claims for
what form does—providing access to pure or transcendent beauty,
or to higher or underlying reality—histories often work on the basis
of just one or other of these explanations. But attempts to single out
any one of these break down when we look closely at the activity of
the most famous critics. Fry, for example, combined deep
engagements with Maurice Denis’ symbolism, “empathy”-based
connoisseurship, and WölfØin’s art history, all the while citing Tolstoy
as the theorist who had revealed the communicative nature of art.
Even then, and in the very same pages, Fry offered purist statements
that allowed contemporaries and subsequent commentators alike to
conclude that he was interested in nothing but a notion of beauty on
Platonic lines.
A more generalised explanation can be grounded in the idea of
“interpretative vision,” or the “broadly Kantian” idea that an
individual’s consciousness makes up their world for them.  For
David Summers, formalism from its origins through to the
poststructuralist art history of the late twentieth century has taken
style to reØect this constituting activity, so that style provides a safe
route to the worldview of the maker: “Artifacts belonged to styles,
continuities characteristic of the imagination of individuals and
groups, from the expressions of which certain conclusions might be
drawn about individuals and groups themselves.”  A crucial point,
on this account, came with the early modern rise of the “rejection of
the idea that there was a direct causal link between the forms of
things in the world and the form of mental representations.  The
new model—of the “pictorial” imagination—held that
representations were presented in the imagination as uni×ed pictures,
with their unity given by the subject whose mind had constituted the
picture, rather than the external world itself. As Kant put it in the
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preface to the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, “our
representation of things, as they are given to us, does not conform to
these things as they are in themselves…these objects as appearances
conform to our mode of representation.”  The idea that art was
essentially “formal” emerged in the late eighteenth century as a direct
corollary of these ideas. The primary object of art-critical and
historical interest became the modes of representation themselves, as
these representations were taken to be projections of the synthesising
activity of the imagination, and as such were presumed to embody
both individual and group kinds of historical subjectivity—personal
“sensibility” and collective “worldview” in what is now everyday
language. As a revelation of inner “syntheses and schemata,” the
“manner of treatment” or the “how of representation” was
effectively the means by which the artwork “‘expresses” both
personal and collective “points of view”:
the “forms” of art in the new aesthetic sense of the
word do not simply synthesize what is intuited or “felt,”
they also express that intuition or feeling, making it
evident, available, and experienceable by a “viewer,” that
is, by one also assumed to possess a pictorial
imagination. Form is presumed to be an adequate
“medium,” conveying both personal and collective
intuitions through “style,” and would thus seem to
provide a clear path for interpersonal and intercultural
communication, if not understanding, since everyone
may see (or be taught to see) the expressive forms of
everyone else’s art…If theme is constant and therefore
neutral, telling variations are to be seen in comparing
the character of the synthesis of the formal means of
representation. Again, individual “style,” evident in
idiosyncratic treatments of line, shape, and colour, is
rooted in the painter’s individual temperaments and
imaginations, that is, in the formative principles that
literally make images out of the same but differently
intuited world.
For both Summers and Whitney Davis, who has expanded on the
account, twentieth-century formalist critics emerge as direct
descendants of this tradition—making use of the dynamics of form in
human intuition of things in the world to move from their own
sensibilities to those of the original makers.  Davis adds a more
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explicit analysis of “high” formalist criticism to this model, noting
that the practice of a writer like Fry is coordinated not on the object
as such, but on the actual “art-historical” object of formalist analysis:
“the artist’s form-making capacities and sensibilities.”  Relying on
the possibility that the perceived form (the “formality”) of the work
can be grasped through essential habits of human intuition, Fry’s
subjectivist method enacts a kind of transference from critic to artist
in order to achieve a “virtual historical psychology” of the artist and
their contemporaries. It involves not just the critic’s intuitive grasp
and subsequent description of the “formality” of the work, but also
their formally inØected perception of the depicted scene, moving in
the process from Fry’s vision in the present to the artist’s vision in the
past and drawing a history out of this shift.  (History, in particular,
because Fry’s interest here is not so much in form as such, but rather
“in identifying artistic expressivity, what lies behind the painting’s
form in the painter’s character, experience, and culture.” ) Amidst
the almost unmanageable mass of contextual data that might
seemingly “bear on the intentional structure of the artwork in its
social and cultural milieux,” the great and continuing appeal of this
kind of critical method has been its ability to sift and sort.  The
apparent formality is used to provide a narrated synthesis of
putatively relevant circumstantial fact with the look of the work—to
give the impression that the critic’s text has opened a window onto
the world of the artist at the moment of production.
The Language of Art Criticism
For those willing and able to adopt the Kantian terminology, such an
approach may be an entirely satisfying way to pursue the issue.
Nonetheless, many have so far struggled with artists’ and critics’
apparent blindness to or active refusal of these particular
philosophical ideas, and with the tendency of the same artists and
critics to develop a range of alternative justi×cations for their
methods that might appear to either subvert or render irrelevant the
Kantian paradigm. Further historical investigation could potentially
map the reworking or rejection of this paradigm in the many variants
of formalism. But a unifying account also requires an equivalent
generalised discussion of the way that form is used in the narrativised
synthesis of context and work that is as minimalist as possible in its
intellectual-historical claims; one anchored not so much in high
philosophical thought, as in the language and rhetoric commonly
used by formalist writers of many different kinds.
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This involves a turn away from deep theoretical “explanation” of
critical practice, and a focus instead on description of its operations.
Something of this sort is suggested by a combination of formalism’s
connection to style and process—informed by the discussions
mentioned above—with Michael Baxandall’s meditations on the
language used in art history and art criticism. These meditations are
so appropriate because, as will become clear, the Baxandall
of Patterns of Intention is not so much an anti-formalist as someone
with a cautious respect for writers like Fry at their most complex and
interesting, and who thus wants to ×nally sort out what can be
salvaged and what must be discarded.
In these writings Baxandall points out how little of what is said about
works of art really makes use of “direct descriptive language,” or
words that refer directly to the object (“large, Øat, pigments on a
panel, red and yellow and blue”).  Baxandall instead highlights three
kinds of “indirect” language. The ×rst of these are words that
concern the  effect  of the picture on the beholder (“poignant,”
“enchanting,” “surprising”).  The second are  comparative  words,
including metaphors about both formal and representational features
of the work (“resonance (of colours)” or “columnar (drapery)”).
The third are cause words, which are used to “describe the effect of
the picture on us by telling of inferences we have made about the
action or process that might have led to the picture being as it is”
(“assured handling, of a frugal palette, excited blots and scribbles”).
While critical practice of all sorts will tend to shufØe between all three
levels, it is the “comparative” words that deal with statements solely
about the ×nished object. The “cause” words are those that can track
back from manifest features of the object to the set of actions of the
maker through which the work came into being, and as such appear
to correspond more to the style or process-based (“good”)
formalism. Baxandall was clear that the “effect of the picture” was
the real object of interest, but under the banner “inferential
criticism,” proposed that words of the third type offered the best
hope of talking about works of art in convincing ways.
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It might initially here seem that comparative words correspond to a
narrow or morphological formalism, and inferential cause words
correspond to the style or process-based “good” formalism. But
something more interesting is brought out by a passage discussed by
Baxandall, from Kenneth Clark’s description of Piero della
Francesca’s Baptism of Christ (Fig. 1):
we are at once conscious of a geometric framework;
and a few seconds’ analysis shows us that it is divided
into thirds horizontally, and into quarters vertically. The
horizontal divisions come, of course, on the line of the
Dove’s wings and the line of angels’ hands, Christ’s loin-
cloth and the Baptist’s left hand; the vertical divisions are
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the pink angel’s columnar drapery, the central line of
the Christ and the back of St. John. These divisions
form a central square, which is again divided into thirds
and quarters, and a triangle drawn within this square,
having its apex at the Dove and its base at the lower
horizontal, gives the central motive of the design.
Though Baxandall did not address this as formalism by name, his
discussions make clear two key points about it. The ×rst is that most
formalist art writing tends to operate at the level of analogy. When
Clark talks of a geometrical framework, with horizontals, verticals, a
square, and a triangle, this description “is a representation of thinking
about a picture more than a representation of a picture.”  Despite
appearances it trades not in direct descriptions of the (physical)
“object,” but in the use of indirect, comparative, words to describe
something extra that the critic thinks up in front of the work (Fig. 2).
This lack of direct connection between word and thing takes on a
special signi×cance given the second point, which is that in any
extended piece of art critical writing “ambiguities or conØations of
type develop” between “cause” and “comparative” words in
particular, with “shifts in the actual reference of terms.”  “Firm
design,” again applied to the Baptism, might seem to be a clear
enough comment on pictorial structure of the external shape kind—
an example of a narrow, morphological formalism. But Baxandall
notes it was originally for him “a thought that involved an inference
about cause. It described the picture by speculating about the quality
of the process that led to it being an object of a kind to make that
impression on me that it does.”  “Design” is here doing double
work as a cause and a comparative word; it starts out as a comment
by the critic on the appearance of the object, then becomes an
inference about cause because it is also a judgement about how the
maker worked to make the object appear. The two types of
formalism are thus folded into one.
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Design was the example Baxandall took with Clark and Piero in
mind, but common words such as “plasticity,” “rhythm,” “structure,”
and of course “form,” all tend towards this slippery dualism, as can
even the most apparently static of geometrical terms. When Clark
suggests that the “triangle” with its apex at the dove “gives the
central motive of the design,” the identi×cation of the supposed shape
is not just a judgement about a balanced and aesthetically pleasing
composition, but also a judgement about the activity of Piero in the
making of the work. The “triangle” is not just an obvious thing
about the work for us in the present; it reveals that when the work
was originally made—formed or designed—it functioned equally as
an organizing principle in Piero’s production of the work, bound up
with the set of actions through which the work was produced. In this
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way the aesthetic or affective can re-enter the scene. Having taken
the apparent formal structure of the work as a general “pattern of
intention” embodied in the work, the critic can put into effect the
rhetorical shift from their own experience in the present to that of
the artist in the past. They are now able to use (type one) “effect”
words—”calming,” “enchanting,” and so on—as if these take some
of their authority from the discerned purposive activity of the artist.
As the example of the “triangle” suggests, because talk of formal
features at the “comparative” level cannot claim to be identifying
physical properties of the object, the implicit justi×cation for their
relevance is that it is equivalent to the (past) meaning of the work—
be that a matter of intention or of signifying structure, as different
versions of formalism might construe it.  Still, the passage quoted
from Clark adopts the stance of the critic looking at the object in the
present day. It is only implicit that the discerned pictorial order
relates to Piero’s activity, his construction of the work in a way that
manifested the peculiar pictorial order. But a further feature of
almost all formalist criticism is that in certain sentences or phrases
the shift from “impression on me” to “quality of the process” that
made it this particular impression-giving object—the slide from
“effect” on the viewer back to visual evidence of the actions by
which the work was created (or of which it consists)—is secured
more directly, with a tactic that Christopher Green once described as
that of looking “as” the artist.  “Looking as if the artist and
describing as the critic” would be more precise, since in practice this
way of writing gives the impression that the critic has momentarily
assumed the artist’s subjectivity, and is now reporting back to the
reader on what they have seen. The artist rather than the work
becomes the subject of the sentence, allowing the critic’s own
“effect” words to pass as (hypothetical posits about) impressions that
the artist had, and their “comparative” words about formal structure
to shade into “cause” words about the probable making of the work.
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To take another passage favored by Baxandall as an example, this
time WölfØin’s description in Classic Art of Raphael’s frescos in the
Camera della Segnatura (Fig. 3), we read that “Raphael saw that,”
“Raphael wanted to,” “Raphael complied with” (though “he reserved
his right to”), “Raphael decided to” and so on.  The full power of
this technique is clear in a sentence like “There is a distinct Øow of
movement from the left towards the centre: the pointing youth, the
praying ×gures, the expressive ×gure seen from behind, combine to
form a sequence of related actions which the eye follows with
pleasure, and Raphael always took this guiding of the eye into
consideration, even in his later works.”  The eye’s “pleasure” in the
composition is secured by the “knowledge” that Raphael always
enacted this kind of consideration, and with this, the “distinct Øow of
movement” referred to becomes as much a statement about cause—
Raphael’s characteristic concern in distributing ×gures—as a
judgement on morphology or effect on the viewer.
What is so striking about this tendency, aside from its almost
universal employment by formalist art critics and historians, is how
despite the wealth of accounts of intention offered before and since
Baxandall wrote, it in practice seems to obviate the worries about
intention (and evidence for it) that communication might involve.
The kind of “intention” allegedly recovered is not a particular
psychological state or set of mental events inside the artist’s head, as
Baxandall was keen to stress, but a more general idea of
“purposefulness” that implies little more than the common sense
premise that a set of historical circumstances stands behind and has
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constituted the “forward-leaning look” of any object.  Assuming the
work’s structure in the past to suf×ciently equate to the work’s
structure in the present, the most salient effects in the present are
taken to match up to the relevant effects in the past. Formalism
thereby assumes that the features being picked out are part of a
“best possible” construction of what was done when the work was
created, but even where the “artist’s vision” is rhetorically adopted
this need have nothing to with the artist’s biography, psychological
disposition, or mental states. In this way formalism can work equally
well for those who see intention as equivalent to meaning (the
experience may be of the “intentional structure” of actions that make
up the work), and those who see intention as a naïve and
unworkable construct (the experience may simply reveal the
particular codes or devices through which the work operates).  In
the latter case it is able at once to attribute signi×cance through the
quasi-intentionalist mode of writing described here, and to pass in
everyday description as “anti-intentionalist,” as writers from WölfØin
and Shklovsky to Clement Greenberg have combined this general
way of operating with explicit denials of the admissibility of artists’
actual, consciously made, statements about their own work.
The Formalist Tradition
To sum up, then. The work’s structural equivalence in present and
past gives apparent authority to the critic’s own experience of the
work, with form allowing descriptions of salient effects in the present
to become descriptions of relevant effects in the past. This also
allows the critic to recognize (intuit or infer to) cause, not in terms
of a set of separate and now recoverable mental states, but as the set
of the artist’s actions that are taken to make up the work. In the
writing technique that I have referred to in terms of “the artist’s
vision” this is reØected at the rhetorical level in critics’ narration of
their “looking” at the picture as if they have direct knowledge about
that artist’s actions, with the artist made the subject of the sentence
and the (particular critic’s) “effect” words used as if the posits about
intention behind and experience of the work have come from the
artist themselves. Form may well be encountered as external shape or
composition, but this is taken not only as a static ×nality but also as
the end process of the artist’s creative (forming) activity, trading on
the inevitable ambiguity between the two. The attempt categorically
to demarcate morphological and style- or process-based formalisms
is thus rendered irrelevant in practice, and all the while formalism’s
ability to slide along this scale allows it to dodge attacks and to
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reappear in new guises unrufØed. The securely identi×ed operation of
the work in turn allows for higher level interpretation to proceed on
this basis, taking it up as the foundational ingredient—moving from
effects in the present, to the past, and potentially on to everything
from the thematization of problems like those described in this essay,
to meanings of the work in its original social and cultural milieu.
I want to ×nish here with nods in just three directions: the discussion
of non-formal elements; the place of intention; and consequences for
thinking about the history of formalism.
First of all, attention to the actual writing of critics reveals that even
the most rigid of formalists tended to “see” and talk about subject
matter, context, and so forth in their descriptions of works, giving
form a particular sort of primacy rather than exclusive attention.
Form is the basis of using items of visual culture historically because
it is there that one has the affective material trace—“×rst-hand
evidence” in the words of Michael Fried’s poem—of what the
producer has done, the functioning of their work, and thus the basis
of any kind of thematic or historical interpretation that claims to
proceed through sensitive consideration of the work itself. The
effects identi×ed by the critic have ranged, depending on other
theoretical commitments, from the narrowest sort of “aesthetic
emotion” (Clive Bell) to any type of experience at all put into the
work (I.A. Richards), but even in Bell’s case examination of his actual
critical practice inevitably demonstrates broad discussion of aspects
such as represented subject matter and even context. This is because
even for as dogmatic a writer as Bell, form is a stage in the
interpretative process—the interest is not form in isolation, but
form’s ability to “properly” guide (determine and delimit) the often
highly speculative and imaginative ways in which the work is
engaged with.  Hence the appeal of T.J. Clark’s apparently
counterintuitive observation that “The best formalists of a theoretical
disposition—Riegl, WölfØin, Sedlmayr, Marin in his distinctive way—
end up treating the problem of form’s meaningfulness on a case by
case basis, much like the rest of us, producing ‘readings’ ad hoc, and
at all key points deploying (Øoridly) analogical and metaphorical
language.”  And no wonder that for Clark one of the most skillful
critics in this vein might be the at ×rst glance radically anti-formalist
—“literary” and “unsystematic”—Edward Snow.
Looking more closely at intention raises a deep question about
formalist method, at least in the “artist’s vision” vein. In reality, what
gets attributed as the purpose or generalised intention behind the
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work is simply a set of hypothetical posits. It is unclear as such
whether critical skill lies more in getting these posits “right,” or in
presenting them in an imaginative and rhetorically satisfying way.
This, ultimately, is the game that must be played when form is used
to produce the most satisfying critical writing—a project of
signi×cance-construction that not only brings us to “see the work in
a new way,” but which can, through its rhetoric, present this new-
found seeing as a kind of historical discovery. And acknowledgement
of the “game” implies that attacks on traditional art history as a
discipline that fetishizes passive reception might have missed the
point—might have been too quick to take allusions to the possibility
of direct artist-viewer transference at face value.  Art history, in as
much as it has historically relied on formalist method as one of its
grounding premises, was (and still is) an activity of active
construction and creation rather than merely passive art
appreciation.
And what light, ×nally, does this generalised model cast on the
history of formalism? At one end of the twentieth century, it suggests
that the shift towards modernist critical method was at once an
attempted correction to  and  a wider popularization of what have
been called “the impressionistic characterizations of art that had been
promulgated in the handbooks—characterizations that were
subjective in the bad sense because their authors imagined that they
could see, or empathetically replicate, the Geist  of the artist in the
work.”  In this sense it may be deeply misleading to take the Anglo-
American critical tradition from Roger Fry and Clive Bell through to
Clement Greenberg as having inaugurated a new “formalist”
aesthetic paradigm, rather than as a smaller sub-section of a much
wider trend. At the other end of the century, it bolsters the earlier
suggestion that with his programme of “inferential criticism,”
Baxandall was looking not to reject outright so much as to sort
through and salvage the useful bits of formalist critical method.
(Baxandall, incidentally, did try to ally his practice with what he called
“the English art critical tradition—Fry, Ruskin, Adrian Stokes,” and
even joked that the pushing away of aesthetic value was hard to take
for a “Roger Fry man” such as himself. ) Ironically enough, too, the
strongest critics of an intrinsic tie between form and the aesthetic
evaluation of artworks might also be examples of the ful×lment, or
culmination, of formalist logic. Take the Richard Wollheim
of Painting as an Art, a book that Baxandall himself described as “in
the Roger Fry tradition.”  Rejecting “form” as a source of singular
aesthetic experience, Wollheim turned instead to the recovery of
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process as a source of meaning: holding up stylistic analysis (as
connoisseurship) as the paradigmatic art-critical activity, and turning
to deeper psychological and psychoanalytic analysis for explanation of
the role of the surface of the artwork in revealing the mind (and its
depths) of the artist.
These concerns have remained prominent wherever “close looking”
has held sway, a point dramatized, ×nally, by two apparently very
different recent books.  In  Realism after Modernism, Devin Fore
recovers Russian formalist method through attention to individual
“devices” by which realism is organised, understood as “systems for
the production of self-knowledge and frameworks for organizing
subjective perception” that “historically contributed to a particular
con×guration of thought and experience now associated with the
modern humanist subject.”  In  The Emergence of the Classical
Style in Greek Sculpture, Richard Neer turns to an analysis of style as
“the speci×c way in which artifacts are seen to address themselves to
beholders,” noting that “structures of beholding constitute real
historical and political situations,” wherein “ideologies of gender,
modes of subjection, relations of power” are “at stake.”  Fore’s
assumption that form always opens on to subjectivity and ideology
allows him to extrapolate from the formal devices of 1920s and
1930s artistic production—described variously as “individual mimetic
devices” or “aesthetic devices” or “techniques or genres”—to the
speci×c historical con×guration of their “corresponding
anthropomorphist postulates”: from the historical transformation of
“linear perspective” to that of “the spatially centered Cartesian ego,”
or that of “autobiography” to “the mnemonic integrity of the self.”
Neer is able to likewise work from the appeal to the beholder made
by surface and narrative to the apparent revelation of interiority
implied by Classical sculpture, or from a newfound three-
dimensionality in relief sculpture to Athenian politics in the shadow
and wake of the Peloponnesian War. Neer is more direct in stressing
the role of personal experience in his analyses of the historical
operations of the works, but even a recovered Russian formalism
cannot claim to have found the rules for a “language” of visual form
that would obviate this step.  In both cases forms are used to move
from experiential encounters in the present to the proper functioning
of works, which in turn forms the basis of the historical account
—“deducing from the form of an object the forces that have been at
work,” according to Franco Moretti’s “most elegant de×nition ever of
what literary sociology should be.”
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In terms of the persistence of formalism, from this perspective, it is
clearly beside the point that few ever managed a criticism predicated
on the pursuit of pure “aesthetic experience,” the total neglect of
representation in favour of “form,” and complete indifference to
“purposefulness” or human made-ness. Wollheim once complained
that the “historical” bias of the academic study of the visual arts was
itself a historical accident that needed interrogation. But his con×dent
use of style to see the past in the present was then, and has
remained, as standard a way as any to examine art and end up with
history.
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debate. As Sandra Macpherson puts the negative case, after surveying various slippages in a
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analogues has gained some popularity in recent years, it is the exception that proves the rule.
Its still-marginal status dramatizes the dominance in the humanities of individually investigated
case-based studies of particular works or small groups of works. It is also worth noting that
Moretti still keeps to the strategy of inference, in the case of “Graphs, Maps, Trees” moving
from the rise of free indirect style, via its tension between partial freedom of the individual and
the impersonal narrative stance, to the problem of modern socialization.
 
